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RECENT DECISIONS
It seems clear that the new flexibility given the Federal
Trade Commission by this decision is desirable. No longer need
the Commission wait until the standards of illegality demanded
by Section 3 of the Clayton Act are met in order to attack a
particular trade practice. Instead, the Commission can now act
in the manner originally intended and bring to a halt any unfair
method of competition at the first hint of a potential lessening
of competition.37  However, this power is apparently limited by
the condition that the practice attacked must resemble a Clayton
Act violation, even though it is not specifically within the purview
of that act.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS-
CONTEMPT CONVICTION HELD VoID WHERE SUBCOMMITTEE IN-
QUIRY IS NEITHER SPECIFIED NOR AUTHORIZED BY PARENT COM-
MITTEE. - Petitioner, while testifying before a Subcommittee of the
House Un-American Activities Committee, refused to answer ques-
tions concerning his alleged Communist affiliations. He chose not
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, but instead chal-
lenged the jurisdiction of the Committee and its Subcommittee, the
authorization of each, and the constitutionality of the inquiry in
general. The petitioner was convicted of contempt of Congress.
This conviction was unanimously reversed by the United States
Supreme Court which held that petitioner was not in contempt
since the subject matter of the inquiry was never specified by the
Committee, as required by its own rules, nor was there a lawful
delegation of authority to the Subcommittee to conduct the in-
vestigation. Goiack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
The power of Congress to punish witnesses for contempt
is derived by implication from its constitutional power to punish
the contumacious behavior of its own members.: The purpose of
this power is the self-protection of the legislative forum and the
furtherance of its lawmaking functions.2 Also, inherent in the
congressional power to formulate laws is the power to investigate. 3
If legislation is to be sound it must be the product of a well-
informed legislature, and undoubtedly one of the best methods
of obtaining information is to conduct fact-finding hearings and
37 S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914).
1 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 225 (1821). "Each
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members
for Disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel
a Member." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5.
2 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 153, 158-60 (1926).
3 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160, (1927).
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investigations.4  Both the power to punish for contempt and the
privilege to conduct legislative hearings can be traced to the House
of Commons in Great Britain.5 In colonial America, as part of a
reaction to royal usurpation of governmental power, both these
reflections of legislative power were quick to take root." They
survived the American Revolution,7 and, in 1798, were embodied
in a federal statute which authorized Congress to punish witnesses
summoned by investigating committees for contemptuous behavior."
Most early litigation arising from the exercise of the con-
tempt power in conjunction with the privilege of inquiry concerned
Congress' constitutional scope of authority.9 The Supreme Court
early held that the purpose of the House's power to punish witnesses
for contempt was to enforce its laws.10 It rejected the theory that
an express constitutional grant of power to punish members of
Congress necessarily implied a negation of power to punish non-
members, since to so hold would, in its view, "lead to the annihilation
of almost every power of congress." '-l In Kilbourn v. Thompson,12
4 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1956).
5 " '[The House of Commons] may inquire into every thing which it
concerns the public weal for them to know.... Co-extensive with the
jurisdiction to inquire must be their authority to call for the attendance
of witnesses, to enforce it by arrest where disobedience makes that
necessary...:" Howard v. Gossett, 10 Q.B. 359, 380, 116 Eng. Rep.
139, 147 (1845). "Connected with these matters is the power (or if we
please to call it so, the privilege) of each house to punish persons (whether
they be members of it or not) for a contempt." MAiLm-W, THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 244 (1913). "May divides breaches of
privilege into four classes: . . . (2) disobedience to particular orders . . .
directing persons to come and be examined before the House or a com-
mittee ... ." Id. at 379. See generally HAX.Aw, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
His0Toy OF ENGLAND 269-74 (1886 ed.) for a discussion and examples
of the early exercise of the power to punish for a "breach of privilege"
of the House of Commons. Hallam feels Hall's Case, 4 Co. Inst. 23
(1581), which arose from publication of a book unfavorable to the
Parliament, to be the earliest precedent of Commons' power to punish
for contempt But see Mr. Justice Miller's opinion in Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 183-89 (1880), for a discussion of why he felt the
British Parliament could not serve as a precedent for a similar power
in the Congress of the United States.
6See generally Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for
Contempt,. 74 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 708-12 (1926) for a complete dis-
cussion and thorough documentation of colonial precedents.
7Id. at 712-25.
8 1 Stat. 554, ch. 36 (1798). It should be noted, however, that under
this statute Congress was authorized to punish witnesses directly; it was
not required that the contumacious witness be judicially tried and con-
victed.
9 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204 (1821).
1oAnderson v. Dunn, supra note 9, at 233.
11 Ibid.
12 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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the defendant had been subpoenaed to appear before a special com-
mittee appointed to inquire into the history and affairs of a real
estate pool. After refusing to testify or to produce documents,
Kilbourn was adjudged guilty of contempt by the House itself,
and imprisoned. The Supreme Court held his conviction void
stating that the contempt power could only be exercised when the
testimony of the witness was required for the inquiry, and where
the subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives. 3 There was deemed to be no "general power
of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen." 14
In McGrain v. Daugherty,5 appellee had refused to answer
subpoenas requesting him to appear before a committee investigating
the "Teapot Dome" scandal. After tracing the long history of
legislative power to secure essential information, it was determined
that "the power of inquiry . . . is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function." "I The Supreme Court in-
ferred from the facts that there was a proper legislative purpose,
and, therefore, affirmed the conviction. However, it was noted
"that a witness rightfully may refuse to answer where the bounds
of the power are exceeded or the questions are not pertinent to
the matter under inquiry." '
In 1938, Congress enacted a statute requiring the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify to the Attorney General all cases of contempt. The Attorney
General, in turn, was required to bring the matter before a federal
grand jury. 8 This measure ended the practice of bringing wit-
nesses directly before the bar of the legislature to answer for their
contempt. Thus, the judiciary was made the instrument of what
was formerly a purely legislative "power."
In the same year, a resolution was adopted by the House of
Representatives forming a temporary committee whose purpose
was to investigate un-American activities.'9 This committee re-
mained in existence until 1944. A year later, a House proposal
that there be a permanent inquiry into "un-American" activites
was passed, and the House Un-American Activities Committee
[hereinafter referred to as HUAC] was born.20  Rule XI, the
authorizing resolution of HUAC, states:
'13 Id. at 190.14 Ibid.
15 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
'sId. at 174.
7 Id. at 176. See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929),
wherein the Court placed on the United States the burden of showing
that the question asked was pertinent to the subject matter under inquiry.
28 11 Stat. 156 (1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 194 (1964).
'1 83 CONG. REc. 7568, 7586 (1938).
20 91 CONG. REc. 10 (1945) (Resolution introduced by Representative
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The Committee on Un-American Activities as a whole or by subcom-
mittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1)
the extent, character, and object of un-American propaganda activities in
the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of sub-
versive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign
countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form
of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other ques-
tions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary
remedial legislation.2 1
Many of the more recent challenges to Congress' investigatory
powers have involved the activities of HUAC. In Watkins v.
United States,22 petitioner was convicted of contempt for refusing
to tell HUAC whether or not he knew certain persons to have
been members of the Communist Party. His refusal was based,
not on the privilege against self-incrimination, but, rather, on
the ground that the questions asked him were beyond the authority
of the Committee. The Court, in reversing his conviction, stated
that the "inquiry . . . must be related to, and in furtherance of,
a legitimate task of Congress .... ,, 23 In addition, "investigations
conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators
or to 'punish' . . . are indefensible." 24 In other words, the majority
believed that there was no power to expose for the sake of ex-
posure.2 5 To insure that inquiry was limited solely to further
legislative purposes, they required that there be instructions ex-
plicitly delineating the jurisdiction of the investigating committee
(or subcommittee) and the purpose of the investigation. 26  The
Court further stated that vagueness in the Committee charter was
an indication that the Committee's activities lacked conformance
with the will of the legislature.27 In addition, the resolution author-
izing HUAC was found to be highly amorphous, thus making it
difficult to ascertain what kind of inquiries it was directed to
make."'
With respect to the contempt statute, the Court believed that
because it authorized a criminal prosecution, the same rights
Rankin); See generally CAu, THu HousE Commin "E oN UN-AmERIcAN
AcTrviEs 1945-1950 19-23 (1952); TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 75 (1955).
2191 CONG. REC. 10 (1945).
22354 U.S. 178 (1956).
23Id. at 187. See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)
(mere semblance of legislative purpose is insufficient to support an inquiry
in the face of the Bill of Rights).
24Id. at 187.
25 Id. at 200.





accorded to defendants in other criminal cases must be accorded
to defendants accused of contempt. This is especially important
in ascertaining the pertinency of the questions asked the witness,
which can only be done by considering the subject matter under
investigation. In order to avoid vagueness, this subject matter
must be revealed with "indisputable clarity" 30 by "the authorizing
resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the sub-
committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves. . . ." 31
Subsequently, in Barenblatt v. United States, 2 petitioner, when
questioned by HUAC, refused to answer questions concerning
(1) his alleged Communist activity at a university, and (2) his
membership in the Communist Party. He expressly waived the
privilege against self-incrimination, and, instead, attacked, inter
alia, the jurisdiction of the Committee with respect to its right to
delve into his "religious," "political," or "other personal and private
affairs... ., :3 Barenblatt was convicted of contempt of Congress.
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, affirmed the con-
viction and distinguished Watkins on the facts. Since Watkins
had not been informed of the subject of inquiry, i.e., Communism
in labor, he could not be convicted of contempt for refusing to
answer questions pertinent to the subject of the investigation.
Barenblatt, however, had been told the subject of the investigation
and knew the question was pertinent thereto. The Court held
that since the necessity of inquiry into Communist activities to
effectuate legislation outweighed the appellant's right to remain
silent concerning his associations, he could be constitutionally held
in contempt of Congress. 4
Mr. Justice Black, in a strong dissent, argued that the con-
viction of the petitioner violated the Constitution in several
aspects. Rule XI which created HUAC authorized such broad
and indiscriminate inquiry of witnesses that it contravened pro-
cedural requirements found in the fifth amendment's due process
clause. In addition, by compelling Barenblatt to answer the
questions posed, his freedom of expression was abridged in violation
of the first amendment. Finally, it was Mr. Justice Black's con-
tention that the HUAC hearings constituted part of a program
2) Id. at 208.
30 Id. at 214.31 Id. at 209.
32360 U.S. 109 (1959).
33240 F.2d 875, 879 (1957).34 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1957). The Court seemed
to rely on dictum in Watkins v. United States which stated: "It is
manifest that despite the adverse effects which follow.., compelled dis-
closure . . . the critical element is the existence of, and the weight
to be ascribed to, the interest of .. . Congress in demanding disclosures
from an unwilling witness." 354 U.S. 178, 193 (1957).
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to brand and punish-by public identification and exposure-all
witnesses considered by the Committee to be guilty of Communist
leanings, as well as to punish witnesses who refused, on con-
stitutional grounds, to answer questions asked by the Committee.
Thus, HUAC was improperly attempting to adjudge and punish-
a task exclusively delegated by the federal constitution to the
courts.
3 5
The predecessor of the instant case was one of six cases
decided simultaneously by the Supreme Court under the name of
Russell v. United States.30  There, the Court reversed petitioner
Gojack's conviction since the- subject under inquiry by the Com-
mittee was not stated in the grand jury's indictment for contempt.
It reasoned that the case hinged on the pertinency of the questions,
and that subject matter is an important factor in determining
pertinency. To uphold the validity of an indictment which merely
recited the statutory language would force "the defendant to go to
trial with the chief issue *undefined." 37 In a concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Douglas, adopting Mr. Justice Black's position in
Barenblatt, stated that in a majority of the cases decided with
Russell, the indictment, in and of itself, was unconstitutional as a
contravention of the first amendment.-
In the instant case, Gojack, as did Barenblatt and Watkins,
refused to answer questions posed to him. He challenged the
constitutionality of both the inquiry in general and the specific
questions posed. He also attacked the authorization of both HUAC
and the subcommittee conducting the inquiry. The procedural
defect of the prior indictment in Russell was sought to be remedied
on re-indictment by a recital that "the subject of these hearings
was Communist Party activities within the field of labor. . . ., 39
Nevertheless, the Court reappraised the Russell decision and con-
cluded that there existed a fundamental fault in the HUAC pro-
ceeding which could not be cured by a mere recitation in the
indictment. The Court found that "the subject of the inquiry was
never specified nor authorized by the Committee, as required by
its own rules, nor was there a lawful delegation of authority to
the Subcommittee to conduct the investigation." 40 Approval by
the Committee would not be inferred merely from the fact that
35 Id. at 134.
38 369 U.S. 749 (1962). Russell was decided with five other cases:
Shelton v. United States; Whitman v. United States; Liveright v. United
States; Price v. United States; Gojack v. United States (to which the
instant case'is a sequel). All six cases were brought under 11 Stat. 155
(1857), as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
37 Id. at 759.




the investigation was a part of a continuing Communist-labor in-
vestigation. The Court also reasoned that "as a matter of law...
the usual standards of the criminal law must be observed; including
proper allegation and proof of all essential elements of the offense." 41
One element of the offense is an authorized subject of investigation.
This failure of HUAC to expressly authorize the inquiry was fatal
to the prosecution of petitioner.
The Court further found that the existence of a proper legis-
lative purpose with respect to the investigation was in doubt. This find-
ing was based on various policy declarations made by members of the
Committee regarding the investigation's purpose. It appeared that:
(1) six weeks before the Subcommittee's appointment, the Chairman
of HUAC reportedly announced that "large public hearings in
industrial communities" against "Communists and sympathizers"
would be conducted, exposing and "driving Reds out of important
industries"; 42 (2) HUAC's Chairman stated that the Committee
was interested in seeing petitioner's union go out of business ;43
(3) the Chairman of the Committee allegedly intended to "give
known or suspected commies a chance in a full glare of publicity
to deny or affirm their connection with a . . . conspiracy-or to
take shelter behind constitutional amendments"; " (4) the Chair-
man and members of the Subcommittee stated during the course
of the inquiry that the purpose of the Committee was to expose
and disintegrate union control by Communists;- 5 and (5) there
were instances where Subcommittee members would state one
purpose and then refer to another."
Mr. Justice Black, although concurring, indicated that he pre-
ferred to reverse on the grounds stated in his dissenting opinion
in Barenblatt.4 7
The instant case is illustrative of the Court's reluctance to
review its conclusion in Barenblatt, that the vagueness of HUAC's
charter did not per se prevent compliance with the statutory re-
quirements of congressional contempt. Rather, in approaching
HUAC convictions since Barenblatt, the Court has consistently
avoided appellants' contentions as to violations of constitutional
freedoms, and instead has reversed each contempt conviction on a
narrow procedural ground." The lower federal courts have fol-
41 Id. at 707.
42Id. at 709, n.8.
43Id. at 710.
4 Id. at 709, n.8.
45 Id. at 710.
4Id. at 710-11.4 7 Id. at 717. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 134-62 (1959).
48 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Deutch v, United
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lowed this approach with the result that, in the past five years,
every contempt-of-HIUAC conviction has been voided by the
appellate courts.4  This consistent quashing of HUAC convictions
has consequently resulted in an antagonistic bravado on the part
of many witnesses at Committee hearings.50
It would appear, however, that the Court's avoidance of con-
stitutional questions in reversing every conviction via procedural
reforms has ended. In order to successfully prosecute a witness
for contempt after the holding in Gojack, it is required that:
(1) the subject matter under inquiry is expressly authorized by
the parent committee; (2) the parent committee has expressly
authorized the subcommittee to conduct the particular hearing out
of which the contempt has arisen; (3) the inquiry is in furtherance
of a valid legislative purpose; (4) the subject matter of the
inquiry is pertinent to that purpose; and (5) the question which
the witness refuses to answer is pertinent to the subject matter
under inquiry. In a future case, if these requirements are met,
it is difficult to conceive that the Supreme Court will again be
able to reverse a contempt conviction because of procedural
defects.
The Supreme Court's policy appears to have been composed
of a recognition of the importance of the protections which must
be afforded the individual coming before the Committee coupled
with an awareness of the importance of the function being served
by HUAC. While the existence of HUAC itself has not been
challenged effectively in any of these cases, a judicial determination
that the Committee cannot initiate a contempt prosecution against a
hostile witness under any circumstances would conclusively reduce
this legislative body to the status of a "paper tiger."
Having fully developed the procedural safeguards which
must be employed by HUAC, it appears likely that cases will
arise wherein the determination will have to be made as to whether
or not a contempt of HTUAC conviction can be sustained under
any circumstances. While there is no indication available as to
what the Court's determination would be in that instance, it is
not impossible to speculate as to the consequences of any decision
the Court might make in its review of this legislative activity.
Thus, an affirmance of Barenblatt would revitalize HUAC to
the extent that when the procedural standards of Gojack are met,
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961). As a general rule, "grave constitutional
questions are matters, properly to be decided . . . only when they inescapably
come . . . for adjudication. Until then it is . . . [the court's] duty to
abstain from marking the boundaries of congressional power...." United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953).
49 N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1966, § 4 (News of the Week in Review), p. E7,
col. 6.50Id. at col. 5-6.
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witnesses can be compelled to testify under threat of contempt. Such
a decision would probably reiterate the "balancing of interests"
concept employed in Barenblatt. If, on the other hand, the Court
should decide that this legislative committee could never employ
congressional contempt because of the vagueness of its purpose, it
is not inconceivable that the House would merely re-establish the
same committee, but with specifically enumerated areas of inquiry.
In this event, it does not seem likely that the structure of HUAC
would be substantially affected.
One further point requires clarification. A major prerequisite
for any HUAC inquiry is that the inquiry be in furtherance of
a valid legislative purpose. Indeed, it has been Mr. Justice Black's
contention that the Committee's activities constitute a usurpation
of judicial power in that they are aimed at punishing witnesses,
rather than at obtaining information which will aid in drafting
legislation. Where HUAC acts to influence public opinion or to
expose, and while acting in this role reports a witness for con-
tempt, its resolution is vulnerable to this attack. When it acts in
this way, the authorizing resolution becomes an insufficient basis
upon which to rest all the authority of the Committee. With-
drawn from the authorizing resolution, in such a case, is the strength
it derives from the presumption of validity because of investigation
for a "legislative" purpose. A suggested gauge by which it may
be determined whether HUAC is engaged in its investigations
in order to legislate is the correlation between hearings and
legislation.
Where there is a high correlation between the number of
hearings and the number of bills introduced by a committee, one
could safely presume the committee was acting for a legislative
purpose. Hence, the punishment of witnesses for contempt, in
all likelihood, would be a mere by-product of the legislative
process, and the Committee's authority would not be seriously ques-
tioned. But where there is a low correlation, there should not
be a presumption of a legislative purpose, but rather a presumption
of a purpose either to influence public opinion or to expose. In
that case, abuse of congressional power would seem more probable.
Hence, the Committee's activities would be subject to closer pro-
cedural scrutiny.
It is submitted that the House of Representatives should
modify HUAC's authorizing resolution to assure effective use of
the contempt power in the course of its investigations. Since it
can be determined from the Committee's past investigations which
areas of inquiry are pursued with greatest frequency, enumeration
of specific areas of intended investigation could be accomplished
with relative facility. An enumerated authorizing resolution would
give both clarity of purpose and specificity of subject matter
without sacrificing flexibility since the resolution can be modified
1967 ]
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session-to-session. In this way, the effectiveness of the Committee
can be immediately established without the necessity of further
judicial decisions. Such a procedure would also eliminate any
controversy between the judiciary and the legislature. With the
power of contempt firmly restored, HUAC would then be able
effectively to fulfill its designated purpose, i.e., to conduct investi-
gations essential to the formulation of laws.
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - DUE PRocEss - FAILURE TO IN-
SULATE CRIMINAL TRIAL FROM PREJUDICIAL PUmLiciTY DEEMED A
DENIAL OF DUE PRocEss. - Petitioner Sheppard was tried and
convicted in an Ohio court of second degree murder. Prior to
and throughout the course of the trial petitioner was the subject
of extensive publicity which focused heavily on matters unfavorable
to him. No evidence concerning these matters was ever intro-
duced at the trial. The trial court refused to take steps to
restrict the activities of the news media in gathering material
during the course of the trial, and denied petitioner's request to
poll the jury to determine its exposure to such publicity. On
certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States voided pe-
titioner's conviction and held that the failure of the trial court to
insulate petitioner's trial from pervasive and prejudicial publicity
together with a disruptive courtroom environment deprived him
of the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Sheppard v. Mazwel, 384 U.S. 333
(1966).
It has long been a principle of Anglo-American criminal justice
that a person accused of a crime be afforded a public trial.1 In the
United States, this guarantee is embodied in the sixth amendment
of the Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury. . .. " 2 This guarantee has been made applicable to state
courts through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 3
Its purpose has been stated to be that of serving "as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of perse-
cution," 4 by insuring that the accused's trial will be open to members
of the family and other interested parties rather than merely to
I See Note, Televising Tudicial Proceedings-A Denial of Due Process?,
11 CATHoLC LAw. 331 (1965).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
; See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
4Id. at 270,
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